

MR. HOOVER AND ARTICLE X.

necessity of asking the 28 members of the League . . . to amend it in a vital particular at our request." The *World* says that Mr. Hoover is only asking what the Senate refused to give even to so pure a Republican as Judge Charles E. Hughes. The *Sun* thinks that "to cut the heart out of a cadaver, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations is in this country, is a *post-mortem* exploit of no particular significance," and the *Tribune* expresses an emphatic preference for reservations over actual amendments. In the western press the same themes are repeated in various ways.

The essence of the proposal is the reluctance of Americans to give either an explicit, or even an implied, guarantee of national frontiers. I think this reluctance is justified, and that Article X. cannot be regarded as a final statement of international obligations in this matter. The origin of Article X. was the German invasion of Belgium, carrying with it the breakdown of the European guarantee of her neutrality. The framers of the covenant saw that, as long as no measures were taken to secure the general peace and to give even a recalcitrant Power strong reasons for refraining from war, it was practically useless to renew special and local guarantees for Belgium or for any other nation in a similar situation. When President Wilson said that there must be either no war or no neutrals, he had in mind the alliances and counter-alliances of Europe which have grown up to preserve the balance of power, but which made it certain that, if war came, all Europe would be involved in it. But he must also have meant that he hoped so to organise the new relations of the nations that a war-making Power would be regarded as an outlaw, and that the whole force of the civilised world would, of necessity and of right, be arrayed against it. Even those who regard such a scheme as Utopian will recognise that the choice lay between it and a return to the system of alliances which had, in fact, not saved Europe from war. It was at least worth trying, and its trial is not yet complete, though the omens for its success are unfavourable.

What, then, did the authors of Article X. really mean when they drafted the article in its present form? First of all they assumed that the frontiers of Europe would be drawn by the Peace Conference in such a way as to command the assent of all reasonable men. They cannot have assumed anything else. The Treaties invalidate the assumption in several important regions, though a genuine effort was made in Paris to trace the new frontiers along the lines of nationality, with due regard to economic and other needs. As matters stand Article X. could not be invoked in such cases as the Austro-Italian frontier in Tyrol or the Russo-Polish frontier, to name only two very different cases where controversy must arise. The article itself is, therefore, premature in its present form, though it must clearly form part of the general contract of any League of Nations worth the name. It is extremely difficult to draft an article which would meet the needs of the situation. In principle, of course, it is a good thing to have secured the assent of most of the Powers to the conception of a mutual guarantee; and if it were put to the vote of the

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nations concerned, America not excluded, we should probably get an overwhelming majority in favour of the doctrine that the victor in war shall not be entitled to annex territory simply because he is able to dictate his terms. The will of the people concerned and the judgment of the impartial world must be the final justification for the transfer of European territories. Article X. may thus be read as notice served on the victors of the future that their title to territorial gains in war will be scrutinised in the light of the principle of nationality, reasonably and justly interpreted.

America would render a real service to the world if, after her presidential saturnalia, she expressed her readiness to enter the League, on the understanding that (a) the question of disarmament was seriously taken up by the Council and a definite ratio of limitation laid down for the whole world; (b) the meaning and phraseology of Article X. should be thrown open for discussion, without *arrière pensée* and without haste, so that the debate might reveal the highest common measure of agreement. It would be unwise to press for quick decisions on either of these points, just as it is foolish to force the League into positions it cannot, for the present, occupy. But we hope we can rely on the representatives of the United States, once they appear at the table of the League, to keep these vital questions alive and work for sound answers to them.

One word has to be added. I am not blind to the danger of assuming that American policy is idealistic or that, in sober truth, she wants to disarm. In general principle the American people are pacific, altruistic, utterly unmilitarist; in particular application (e.g., Mexico, Japan) they are arrogant, nationalist, ready to fight. I do not suggest for a moment that a war with Mexico would be popular outside the oil ring and the army; it would not, and Senator Harding's equivocation on the point is the best proof of its unpopularity. But American history shows the American people pugnacious, acquisitive, and just as imperialistic as any European dynasty. We may, therefore, be warned not to rely upon them to carry more than their share of the burden of the world's liberalism. What I believe to be certain is that, in Great Britain as in America, the liberal forces, in the largest sense of the word, are powerful enough to compel their Governments, once they are both in the League, to work together whole-heartedly for the League's good. Mr. Hoover's words to the Republican party open the door to that end.

A. F. WHYTE.

The Egyptian Settlement

ON 24 August the British press published the outlines of the agreement that has, so far, been reached between the Milner Mission, on the one hand, and certain representative Egyptians on the other.

The points upon which agreement has been reached do not by any means cover the whole ground. There is no reference in the published *communiqué* to—(1) The Sudan; (2) the Egyptian Army; (3) the

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Sultanate. Each of these presents problems of great import, as far-reaching, if not more far-reaching than the points upon which agreement has been reached.

The latter are set forth under the seven following heads:—

(1) Recognition of Egyptian independence by Great Britain, who guarantees Egypt's integrity against outside aggression, and will have, on account of her privileged position, access to Egyptian territory in case of war.

(2) Great Britain to maintain a garrison in the Suez Canal zone.

(3) Egypt to control her foreign policy and have the right to have her own diplomatic representatives abroad. No treaties to be made at variance with British policy, and, in countries where no Egyptian representative is appointed, Britain will represent Egypt.

(4) The Capitulations to be abolished; the veto on legislation affecting foreigners will be vested in the British High Commissioner.

(5) There will be no more Advisers in the different Ministries. A British official will be appointed to take over and carry out the operations of the Public Debt Commission, and another to look after legislation affecting foreigners.

(6) Rights of present British officials to be safeguarded; those desiring to resign to be generously compensated. All British officials retained or appointed will be responsible to the Egyptian heads of their various departments.

(7) The final agreement will be negotiated between properly accredited representatives of the two Governments, and will be submitted for confirmation to the British Parliament and the Egyptian National Assembly. It is highly probable that the latter will be asked to pass a new Organic law embodying the new agreement and laying down the future constitution of the country.

These outlines of agreement involve many fundamental changes. First and foremost the "Protectorate" declared by Great Britain in December 1914 and recognised by the Powers signatory to the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Sèvres comes to an end. Egypt will presumably apply for and obtain independent representation on and membership of the League of Nations. Egypt will no longer be either in name or in fact part of the British Empire.

The British Army of Occupation will apparently be withdrawn from Cairo to the Suez Canal zone—*i.e.*, to the towns of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez—leaving the Egyptian Army responsible for the ultimate maintenance of the authority of the Government in the Nile valley below Wadi Halfa.

This Egyptian army will presumably be responsible solely to the Egyptian War Office. At present the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army is also Governor-General of the Sudan and resides at Khartoum. In future these two functions cannot be carried out by the same person. Two problems are presented by the withdrawal of the British garrison to the Canal. First, there is the defence of Egypt's Western frontier against the very restive Senussi and Bedouin tribes. Presumably the prime

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responsibility will be left to the Egyptians themselves, but, in the event of serious trouble, British troops will act as a reserve to prevent the loss of the Western oases. Secondly, the garrison and towns of the Suez Canal are dependent for their lives upon a fresh water canal brought from the Nile near Benha, and effective control of the Canal, which is vital to our Imperial communications and the shipping of the civilised world, depends on the control of the water supply for the fresh-water canal that runs alongside the salt water ship canal. The strategic control of the Canal has, of course, been greatly affected by the assumption of mandatory power by Britain in Palestine, whose southern frontier is coterminous with the Eastern frontier of Egypt.

Clauses (4) and (5) embody two vital changes in the internal government of Egypt. Under the Capitulations, which are to be abolished, the various large foreign communities resident in Egypt—Greek, Italian, French, etc.—were each under the Protection of their own Consuls-General, and the powers of the Egyptian Government in respect to the taxation of, legislation for, and administrative control over foreign protected persons were of the most exiguous kind. The abolition of the Capitulations and the vesting of the safeguarding of their rights in a British official is a matter not merely of British and Egyptian negotiation, but of international discussion and action. It will be necessary for all the 13 States enjoying rights in Egypt under the Capitulations to agree to their abolition and to the new powers and authority to be exercised in their place by the British official.

The abolition of the Advisership system of government, the most generally expected of the new proposals, means complete internal autonomy for Egypt. Under the Adviser system each Egyptian Minister was controlled by the British Adviser, who was, in fact, responsible, and was always so regarded for the various acts done in the name of the Minister. The British Financial Adviser was a member of the Sultan's Cabinet (the Council of Ministers), and, having power over the purse, really controlled the administration of Egypt. The British Advisers had their own staff of inspectors in the Provinces, and while authority, and even responsibility, was nominally vested in the Mudirs of the Provinces, etc., the real power lay in the hands of the British advisers and inspectors. All this is to go. The British officials of the various departments will become the Civil servants of the Egyptian Ministers and will carry out instructions and policy for which the Egyptian Ministers will be responsible. A considerable degree of financial control will, of course, remain with the British official who is to become responsible for the service of the Public Debt, which is largely held outside Egypt, and which will, presumably, be a first charge upon Egyptian revenues. With the exception of this safeguard, and the power of veto and direction to be vested in the British official charged with safeguarding the rights of non-Egyptian subjects, full fiscal, legislative and administrative autonomy is to be conferred upon the Egyptians themselves.

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The way in which the Egyptian Ministry is to be constituted and to become responsible is left to a new organic law, which is to take the place of the organic law of 1913 which established a single Chamber of partly elected and partly nominated members, with certain limited powers. This organic law was based upon the maintenance of the British Advisership system, and consequently will require radical alteration. It is to be hoped that the new organic law will embody provisions for a bi-Cameral system, and that steps will be taken to secure that in the popular Chamber the system of direct election will be substituted for the old system of indirect election, and that effective direct representation of the fellahs, the ordinary cultivators of the soil, who form the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian people, will be secured. The bulk of the peasantry are still illiterate, and in the old Turkish days they were ruthlessly exploited by the Khedive and the Pashas. It is essential to the future progress and prosperity of Egypt that in handing over the responsibility for the internal government of Egypt—for which we have, in fact, if not in name, been responsible since the appointment of Lord Cromer—we should ensure in the new organic law which is to form an integral part of the final agreement between the British and Egyptian Governments, that the fellahs should be placed in such a position and given such political power that they will be able in the future not only to protect themselves and their interests, but to take a progressively more important place in the body politic of Egypt. Before the arrival of the British, the Egyptian nation consisted almost entirely of two classes—the Nilotic fellahs and a ruling class of mixed racial origin, the descendants of the Turkish, Albanian, Syrian and Armenian officials appointed from Constantinople between the Turkish conquest in 1516 and the establishment of the Khedivate by Mahomed Ali in 1828. Though there has been a certain merging during the past two generations by intermarriage and by the rise to wealth and education of a small percentage of the Nilotic element, no one can be blind to the fact that in Egypt, as elsewhere, there is a potential opposition of interest between the educated townsman, on the one hand, and the peasant cultivator on the other. Much depends on the foresight and public spirit of the present leaders of Egyptian public life. No one can doubt their ability or their patriotism. That they have learnt much during the past generation from contact with the West is incontestable, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the new era will find Egyptians of integrity and energy worthy of their great responsibilities.

The future of the Sultanate is important. At the declaration of the British Protectorate in 1914 the British Government undertook to re-establish the Sultanate of Egypt, which had existed from the eleventh century down to the Turkish conquest in 1516, and they selected both the late Sultan Hussein and his successor, the present Sultan Fuad. The person, powers, and succession to the Sultanate will have to be fixed in the organic law. Since 1914 the Sultan has presided in person over the Cabinet. Under the new *régime* he will presumably fill the rôle of a

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Constitutional Monarch, and will derive his authority, not from the British Government, but from the organic law, which will have to lay down the right of succession, etc.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is part of the British Empire and presumably will so remain. Egypt cannot hold it alone or govern it as an Egyptian dependency and there is much to be said for abolishing altogether the Egyptian title. But in return independent Egypt is entitled to require guarantees regarding the Nile and the constitution of a single Nile Conservancy Board which will safeguard Egypt's interests; for the Nile is Egypt's life blood and the future material progress of Egypt depends not merely upon the water received from the Sudan, but from the great lakes of Uganda and the highlands of Abyssinia.

The Milner Mission have displayed patience, statesmanship and courage. No one can accuse them of timidity or of any reluctance to meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people. A parallel has been drawn between their recommendations and the action of the United States in regard to Cuba. Probably there has never been a more remarkable instance of political advance than that now proposed in regard to Egypt. For nearly forty years we have been in *de facto* control of the administration in Egypt. In that short time the moral and material progress of Egypt has been almost miraculous and a large share of the credit is due to men like Cromer, Gorst, Kitchener, MacMahon and Wingate, under whom Egyptians as well as British administrators, engineers, and technicians of all kinds have laboured with conscientious zeal for the advancement of Egypt and her inhabitants. They laid the foundations upon which others will now have to build. It is earnestly hoped that the Egyptian Government will retain the services of many of the men who helped to lay the foundations, and that British administrators, etc. will serve in the future with equal zeal and disinterestedness under the new *régime*. Such service will be in some respects even more honourable and responsible than it has been. Mutual respect and esteem between British and Egyptians can exist on an even firmer basis in the new era than in the past. The steps that both British and Egyptians now propose to take can be taken by both with honour and the future friendship and interests of both peoples should be assured. The proposals are likely to bear considerably upon the wider problems of our responsibilities and undertakings throughout Asia and Africa and their lesson is the lesson that British influence and power in the Old World will in the future be based not upon any desire for domination, but on co-operation with the inhabitants of these historic lands in the re-birth and progress of distinctive civilisations in each of the many countries whither enterprise and the spirit of service has led us. May our success in the new *rôle* not only equal but surpass our success in the old *rôle*, and may we long continue to give to these lands our best in men, in influence for good and in sympathy and encouragement. It is many centuries since Egypt produced in men, in art, science and literature any such distinctive contributions to the highest wealth of man such as she produced at the dawn of history or in the Middle Ages. Cotton and corn are all very well,

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and under British tutelage these have increased manifold. It is in the realm of new creative impulses, whether of thought, speech, or action, that the proudest achievements of a nation are to be found. We look to-day once more to the East—to Egypt, Palestine, Arabia, Persia, India, China and Japan—to produce greatly not merely the material products required for the service of man's material needs, but for ideas, for example, for those achievements in the higher arts and sciences, in religious development even, which come only as the outcome of distinctive civilisations and high endeavour, contributions all and each of them to the slow ascent of man. Egypt is at the very gate of the East. The Great Napoleon called it the most important country in the world. Its history is the longest, its spell and fascination unique. May its future ever be greater than its past.

W. ORMSBY GORE.

Italy and Fiume

WE are told that Signor Giolitti, during his recent conference with Mr. Lloyd George at Geneva, expressed himself as in favour of settling the Adriatic question by means of direct agreement with Jugoslavia, which was, in effect, what Signor Nitti was attempting to do when he was hurled from office. On the other hand, an equally credible authority informs us that Signor Giolitti is of opinion that the question of Fiume, the most burning of all, can only be solved either by Italian sovereignty or by the erection of the city and its surroundings into an independent State.

These conditions, it must be said at once, effectually exclude the possibility of a settlement by consent. The first would be opposed to the end by any possible South-Slav Government; the second seems to be a return to the idea of a buffer State, which even its most sanguine advocates must by now have recognised as still-born. For any one even moderately acquainted with the local circumstances must be aware that the overwhelming composition of any such independent State—unless indeed it were confined to a particular quarter of Fiume itself, inseparable from the rest of the town—must be of Jugoslav nationality, and that the first use of their newly-conferred liberty would be to proclaim their union with their mother-country. As a distinguished Italian historical authority—Professor Salvemini—has put it, even if it were possible to separate off the urban entity Fiume-Susak with its slight balance in favour of Italian nationality—some 25,000 against 23,000—from the surrounding district occupied by a solid population of 200,000 of purely Jugoslav race, such an expedient would be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle of self-determination.

Such extraordinary misconceptions on this matter appear still to be current among the British public—the effect of certain purely local features of the case distorted for purposes of propaganda—that a glance at the broader aspect of the Fiume question is a necessary corrective. Fiume,

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in fact, is the sole practicable maritime outlet for the produce not of Croatia alone, but of the whole Middle Danubian basin. It is the port of Belgrade as well as Zagreb. There is no valid substitute for it; Buccari, that has been suggested, being unapproachable in certain winds, and largely cut off from railway facilities by a steep declivity. Historically, from the early Middle Ages onwards, it has formed an integral part of Croatia, and is described as a Croatian town by Venetian writers. It has never been an Italian town, and its present Italian majority in the "city" has been, as is well known, the result of Hungarian political manipulation within quite recent years. Geographically, economically, and, if we take in its surrounding population, ethnically as well, it is part and parcel of the Slavonic mainland as its predecessor, Tarsaticum, was of the Illyrian provinces before.

The Italian record here has been very bad. One of the worst features of the armistice conditions on the Adriatic side, which made the area to be occupied by Italy conterminous with the lines of the Secret Treaty of London, was that they were drawn immediately outside Fiume. The city itself, which by that instrument was excluded from Italy's gains, could not, naturally, be taken in. But Italian outposts were to be stationed outside its walls, and the rest followed. As a beginning, the Italians did not hesitate to occupy the Island of Veglia and other localities to which they had no right under the armistice conditions. A Serbian commander with 5,000 troops garrisoned Fiume, but the Allies decided that it was to be occupied by an international force, and on this understanding, to which the local Italian commander gave his verbal adhesion, the Serbian general agreed to withdraw his troops, the international occupation to take place after a fixed interval. The Serbian troops withdrew at noon, and an hour afterwards Italian forces poured into the town on both sides, while a further force landed from the Italian squadron off the port. No real attempt was made to call Italy to account for this breach of understanding—bitterly as it was resented by the other Allied commanders, who felt themselves accomplices of a violated pledge. The small contingents of the other Allies that entered the town were brushed on one side, and when some real settlement on international lines appeared to be in sight the Italian garrison allowed D'Annunzio and his band to enter Fiume unopposed. Nor has any serious attempt to bring him to book been made since then by the Roman Government, such as the cutting off of supplies and munitions. Supplies and munitions pass freely through the Italian lines. Since then there has been no question of autonomy at Fiume. The population are coerced and terrorised by a lyrical bandit and his bodyguard.

How does Signor Giolitti propose to make an end of this condonation of such a gross violation of the law of nations? Does he imagine that D'Annunzio will fall in with any imaginable "settlement by agreement"? What is the use of a show of negotiation unless his Government is prepared for a drastic enforcement of such terms of settlement with Jugoslavia as might be arranged? Can he, in fact, deliver the goods? Considering the